For those taxpayers who grieved their 2012 real property tax assessment before a local board of assessment review, but were denied relief, the time period to pursue that challenge in court expires soon. Taxpayers (and their representatives) who choose to file a petition in Supreme Court need to be wary of service requirements or risk dismissal of their action in its entirety. Service requirements for Article 7 petitions are set forth in RPTL Section 708. In addition to establishing the method of service on the assessing unit, Section 708(3) requires a copy of the petition to be mailed to the superintendent of any school district in which the real property at issue is located. Section 708(3) is very clear that “failure to comply . . . shall result in dismissal of the petition, unless excused for good cause shown.”
The requirement to mail a copy of the petition to the superintendent of the school district in which the property is situated has been strictly applied by the courts – most recently by the New York State Court of Appeals in Board of Managers of Copley Court Condominium v. Town of Ossining, No. 134 (June 5, 2012). In Copley Court, petitioner filed petitions challenging its property tax assessments each year from 2001 through 2007. Although the property at issue was located in the Briarcliff School District, petitioner’s counsel mistakenly believed the property at issue was located in the Ossining Union Free School District and mailed notice to the superintendent of the Ossining Union Free School District from 2002 to 2007. The Briarcliff School District intervened and moved to dismiss the petitions for those years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Copley Court’s petitions finding that a mistaken belief as to the identity of the school district in which the property at issue is located does not demonstrate “good cause” that will excuse compliance with the requirements of Section 708.
The Copley Court decision reaffirms a long line of cases that hold good cause is not demonstrated by the absence of prejudice to the affected school district alone – actual notice to that district is immaterial. Despite statutory language that was presumably designed to soften the otherwise harsh results caused by improper service, the case law narrowly construes the statutory exception and imposes a heavy burden on petitioners who fail to strictly comply with the service provisions of Section 708.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decision in Copley Court should serve as a reminder to both petitioners and respondents to review carefully the provisions of Section 708 and determine whether those requirements were satisfied. The answer may just make – or break – your case.
